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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jimmy Thomas Glass appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts of the underlying criminal case and first petition for post-
conviction relief are set forth in Glass v. State, Docket No. 36203, 2010 
Unpublished Opinion No. 354 (Idaho App., February 18, 2010): 
The facts of this case are provided in detail by this Court's 
opinion in Glass's direct appeal. See State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 
190 P3d 896 (Ct. App. 2008). Glass solicited an undercover police 
officer over the internet, believing the officer was a fifteen-year-old 
girl. Glass identified himself online under the username 
"letsgetkinky831" and the undercover officer identified himself 
under the username "Lisa200215ncal." During the course of the 
conversation, Glass invited the undercover officer to view a 
sexually-explicit image of himself and proposed a sexual 
rendezvous. The officer gave the address to a vacant apartment 
building being used as part of a sting operation. Glass agreed to 
meet "Lisa" at the apartment right away because he had to work 
later that day. He indicated that his name was Tom and he would 
be driving a black, two-door car. Shortly thereafter, the car drove 
into the complex parking lot, and Glass approached the apartment 
door and was arrested by police officers. 
Glass was found guilty by a jury of enticing a child over the 
internet. I.C. § 18-1509(A). The district court sentenced Glass to a 
unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement 
of three years. Following Glass's I.C.R. 35 motion, the district court 
reduced his sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of two years. This Court affirmed 
Glass's judgment of conviction in Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 190 P.3d 
896. 
Glass filed a pro se application for post-application relief 
alleging seven claims: (1) the state failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence; (2) the state failed to disclose an expert witness; (3) the 
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prosecutor used perjured testimony; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; 
(5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate a 
potential defense; (6) he was not adequately advised of his rights 
pertaining to the psychosexual evaluation as required by Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006); and (7) ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. Counsel was appointed to 
represent Glass during the post-conviction proceedings. The state 
moved for summary dismissal of the first five claims on the basis 
that Glass had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Specifically, the state argued that the first four claims 
could have been raised on direct appeal and that Glass could not 
show deficient performance on his fifth claim. After a hearing on 
the state's motion, the district court dismissed the first five claims. 
The state conceded the validity of Glass's claim concerning a 
violation of Estrada, and the district court granted a new sentencing 
hearing. Glass conceded that his seventh claim was without merit 
and did not object to its summary dismissal. 
l9..c, at 1-2. Glass appealed. l9..c On appeal he asserted that "the district court 
erred by summarily dismissing his claim that the state committed a Brady1 
violation by failing to disclose the seizure of his laptop computer from work as 
well as the results of any testing conducted on it." l9..c at 2 (internal footnote 
omitted). He also asserted that "the district court erred by summarily dismissing 
his claim of prosecutorial misconduct as it related to the alleged Brady violation 
concerning his work computer." l9..c at 2-3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's order. As to Glass's Brady claim, it held: "[T]he seizure of Glass's 
work computer was the subject of extensive testimony offered at Glass's 
preliminary hearing which was subject to cross-examination by Glass's 
counsel.... Glass's own filings belie his claim that the computer itself was not 
disclosed by the state." l9..c at 4. It further found that the state did not commit a 
Brady violation by failing to disclose the results of testing done on Glass's 
1Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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computer. .!st. at 5. It noted that at the preliminary hearing the state's witness 
testified that a superficial examination of the hard drive revealed the existence of 
the phrase "letsgetkinky831" but that the examiner explained that testing had not 
been completed . .!st. At trial, the state did not use any test results . .!st. The court 
noted that Glass inferred that, because the state did not use the test results, the 
results must have been exculpatory . .!st. It then explained, "in this case, Glass's 
application provided even less than conclusory allegations. It provided only 
implicit inferences and speculation that the results of forensic testing done on his 
work computer must have been exculpatory because the state did not present 
them at trial." .!st. The Court of Appeals held that Glass failed to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact that the state failed to disclose material exculpatory 
information. .!st. 
Glass thereafter filed his successive petition for post-conviction relief and 
affidavit in support, which is the subject of this appeal. (R., pp. 3-31.) In his 
successive petition, Glass made seven claims (R., pp. 3-25), which were 
summarized by the district court: 
1. Prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in 
the form of computer forensic results and the Micron Laptop would 
indicate Glass was not the person chatting with the undercover 
officer in the internet sting operation. 
2. Prosecution made misleading statements to the court, 
i.e. 1) regarding the custody and whereabouts of exculpatory 
evidence which is now lost; 2) allowing perjured testimony by a 
witness without correcting the jury record or addressing the false 
statements; 3) falsely claiming the Micron Laptop was still 1n 
custody, when it was not or failed to preserve the Micron Laptop. 
3. Prosecution failed to disclose the Yahoo! Terms of 
Service Agreement and Yahoo] Registration Page. Undercover 
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agent violated the terms of service by portraying himself as a minor. 
This misconduct was hidden from Petitioner, denying him a valid 
entrapment defense. 
4. Trial counsel was ineffective by failing to have a 
forensic examiner review the computer's contents. 
5. Prosecution represented at a hearing on June 5, 2008 
that the laptop was in law enforcement custody. In January 2009, 
petitioner was informed that the Laptop was no longer in custody 
and had been released. Petitioner claims he should have been 
notified of this. 
6. Following Petitioner's pro se motion to preserve the 
Micron Laptop, petitioner was advised at the hearing on November 
19, 2009, that the laptop had been released to Mr. Ken Grover in 
2006 and that prosecution did not have a copy of the hard drive. 
Because his 'first post conviction attorney did not take possession of 
any evidence from the State regarding the laptop, his attorney was 
ineffective in failing to present evidence at this first petition. 
7. In response to the State's motion for summary 
disposition, Glass alleges there was no connection between him 
and the chat log transcript and cites to United States v. Tank, 200 
F.3d 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000). 
(R., pp. 248-49). The state filed a motion for summary dismissal and supporting 
brief. (R., pp. 225-37.) Glass filed a response to the state's motion. (R., pp. 
238-43.) The district court thereafter summarily dismissed Glass's successive 
petition. (R., pp. 247-53.) Glass timely appealed. (R., pp. 255-58.) 
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ISSUES 
Glass states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it 
incorrectly concluded Mr. Glass's Brady claim was adequately 
raised in his first petition? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 
erroneously found Mr. Glass's claim of ineffective assistance 
showed no basis that trial counsel failed to investigate and prepare 
for trial? 
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 
erroneously rejected Mr. Glass's claim that prosecution withheld 
exculpatory evidence, made misstatements of facts, and violated a 
court order by destroying evidence? 
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 
misconstrued that the newly discovered evidence, the Yahoo! TOS 
agreement, established a prima facia case of outrageous 
government misconduct which would have enabled Mr. Glass to 
either strategically present an entrapment defense or offer an 
entrapment jury instruction at trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 9.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Glass failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his successive 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Glass Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Glass challenges the summary dismissal of his successive post-conviction 
petition. On appeal, he raises four issues - a Brady claim, an ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim, a prosecutorial misconduct claim, and a newly 
discovered evidence claim. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) Glass contends that the first 
three issues were inadequately raised by his first post-conviction counsel. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp. 10, 21, 25.) In addition, he asserts that the district court 
erred in dismissing his newly discovered evidence claim because, he contends, 
the newly discovered evidence would have allowed him to assert an entrapment 
defense at trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-35.) Application of the law to the facts 
supports the district court's determination that Glass failed to establish a valid 
post-conviction claim. Glass has therefore failed to show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate 
court will review the entire record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
Court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. 1fL. 
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C. Glass Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and 
provides: 
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief 
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally 
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction 
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to 
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, 
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in 
the original, supplemental, or amended application. 
(Bold in original.) The plain language of this statute makes clear that successive 
petitions for post-conviction relief are generally not permissible. Summary 
dismissal of a successive petition is therefore appropriate "if the grounds for relief 
were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-conviction proceeding." 
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation 
omitted). Only in cases where the petitioner can show "sufficient reason" why 
claims were "inadequately presented in the original case," may he have the 
opportunity to re-litigate them. 15;l; see also I.C. § 19-4908. Thus, "to prevent his 
second application from being dismissed, [Glass] had the burden of providing the 
district court with factual reasons upon which the court could conclude there was 
a 'sufficient reason' why the grounds for relief asserted in his second petition ... 
'were inadequately raised"' in his original petition. Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 
945, 948, 908 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting I.C. § 19-4908). 
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Idaho courts have long held that deficient representation by counsel in an 
initial post-conviction proceeding, that causes a claim to be inadequately 
presented to the court, constitutes a "sufficient reason" to allow assertion of the 
same claim in a subsequent post-conviction petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. 
See,~. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 
2008); Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Where, as here, a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel as a basis for bringing a successive petition, the relevant inquiry is 
"whether the second application has raised not merely a question of counsel's 
performance but substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." 
Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 496, 887 P.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. App. 1987)). Thus, to 
overcome summary dismissal, Glass was required to allege facts w~1ich, if true, 
showed both (1) that the claims alleged in his successive petition were either not 
raised or were inadequately asserted in his original post-conviction action due to 
the ineffective assistance of his original post-conviction attorney, and (2) a valid 
underlying claim of post-conviction relief. lfL. 
Glass raised four issues in his successive post-conviction petition - a 
Brady claim, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a prosecutorial 
misconduct claim, and a newly discovered evidence claim. There is no question 
that Glass raised the first three issues in his first post-conviction petition. (See R., 
p. 177-186 (Decision And Order Granting State's Motion For Summary Dismissal 
And Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Ground Seven).) See also Glass v. State, 
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Docket No. 36203, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 354 (Idaho App., February 18, 
2010) (affirming the denial of Glass's Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims 
on appeal). 
Glass contends that his first three claims (his Brady claim, prosecutorial 
misconduct claim, and ineffective assistance of counsel claim) were inadequately 
raised below because his first post-conviction counsel failed to present 
admissible evidence in support of the claims. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 10, 21, 
22-26.) Contrary to Glass's assertions, a review of the record and applicable law 
support the district court's dismissal of these claims. He has failed to show either 
that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective or the existence of a valid 
underlying claim. In addition, Glass has failed to show that the district court erred 
in dismissing his claim of newly discovered evidence. 
1. Brady Claim 
In his successive petition, Glass alleged that the "prosecution failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence in the form of computer forensic results and the 
Micron Laptop. This evidence would indicate that the Petitioner was not the 
person chatting with the undercover officer in their 'internet sting' operation." (R., 
p. 6.) He asserted that his post-conviction attorney was ineffective for failing to 
have the hard drive of the computer examined because of his attorney's personal 
belief that there would be no incriminating information on the hard drive, and this 
failure to examine the hard drive resulted in his first Brady claim being summarily 
dismissed by the court. (R., pp. 15-17.) The district court dismissed this claim 
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on the grounds that the claim was "adequately raised in the first petition." (R., p. 
251.) Glass has failed to show error. 
This issue was addressed in Glass's first petition for post-conviction relief 
and was the primary issue raised in his first post-conviction appeal. (See, R., pp. 
180-182.) See also Glass v. State, Docket No. 36203, 2010 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 354 (Idaho App., Feb. 18, 2010). Glass has failed to show that his 
first post-conviction attorney was ineffective for failing to examine the hard drive 
of the computer. Glass has still failed to have the hard drive of the computer 
examined and has still failed to present evidence that any results of forensic 
testing would be exculpatory. In the proceedings on his first petition, the court of 
appeals upheld dismissal of this claim because, in part, Glass's first application 
"provided only implicit inferences and speculation that the results of forensic 
testing done on his work computer must have been exculpatory because the 
state did not present them at trial." Glass, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 354 at 
5. Glass's successive petition still "provide[s] only implicit inferences and 
speculation" that the results of testing would be exculpatory. Because Glass 
failed to present any admissible evidence that his first post-conviction attorney 
was ineffective for failing to examine the hard drive, which could constitute a 
"sufficient reason" to allow assertion of the same claim in a subsequent post-
conviction petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908, he has failed to show that the 
district court erred in dismissing his claim. 
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2. Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim 
Likewise, Glass's prosecutorial misconduct claim was properly dismissed 
by the district court. In his successive petition, Glass asserted that the 
prosecution committed misconduct by 1) making misleading statements to the 
court concerning the custody and whereabouts of exculpatory evidence which is 
now lost; 2) allowing perjured testimony by a witness without correcting the jury 
record or addressing the false statements; and 3) committing perjury for falsely 
claiming the Micron Laptop was still in custody or violating the court order to 
preserve the Micron Laptop evidence. (R., p. 6.) The district court summarily 
dismissed these claims, ruling: 
Glass' first petition was not dismissed until February, 2009. Glass 
raised these issues in his first petition, and or fails to explain why 
he did not raise these issues in his first petition. Glass states a 
bare allegation that the laptop would have exculpatory evidence. 
This claim is dismissed. 
(R., pp. 251-52.) Glass has failed to show error. 
These three claims were raised and denied in Glass's first post-conviction 
proceeding. (See, R., p. 183 ("prosecution did not disclose 'Brady' evidence, 
prosecution misled the court and defense with misstatements of facts, 
prosecution did not disclose an expert witness, and prosecution knowingly used 
perjured testimony").) Because these claims were addressed in Glass's first 
petition, the district court did not err in denying his successive petition on this 
ground. Further, to the extent that these prosecutorial misconduct claims may be 
slightly different than the ones alleged in his first petition, Glass has failed to 
explain why these issues were not raised in his first petition or on direct appeal. 
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Further, these underlying facts are the same facts underlying his Brady 
claim. Because Glass is unable to establish a Brady violation, he is unable to 
establish a prosecutorial misconduct claim in relation to his Brady claim. See 
Glass, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 354 at 5 ("Because we conclude Glass's 
application failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning a Brady 
violation, we need not address Glass's remaining claim that the Brady violation 
related to the disclosure of his work computer and its contents amounted to 
prosecutorial misconduct."). 
3. Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claim 
Glass also asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-21.) In his 
successive petition, Glass claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
not obtaining, consulting and presenting computer expert testimony 
in conjunction with computer forensic evidence; and corroboration 
testimony of Kathy Grover, who told trial counsel's own investigator 
that the Petitioner was using his Micron Laptop during the time 
frame of the alleged crime. Moreover, trial counsel failed to 
properly perform a pre-trial investigation, which is supported by the 
study conducted by the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, which found that Ada County Public Defenders Office 
was constitutionally inadequate spending an average of 2.18 hours 
per felony case. 
(R., p. 7.) The district court dismissed this claim, holding: 
Glass claims he is the owner of the computer. He claims his trial 
counsel should have had the computer analyzed, presumably to 
determine if it was used in the internet "chat" session. The state at 
trial never claimed this computer was used for the chat. The court 
fails to see how a forensic analysis would make a difference in this 
case. Glass provides no basis for believing it would, other than to 
say it could have exculpatory evidence on it. 
12 
(R., p. 252.) Glass has failed to show that the district court erred. 
This claim was dismissed in Glass's first petition because Glass failed to 
present any admissible evidence in support of his claim. (R., pp. 184-85 ("Glass 
has provided no other evidence from witnesses that could change the outcome of 
the case.").) Although in his successive petition he asserted that his first post-
conviction attorney was ineffective and failed to adequately present this claim 
(R., pp. 18-19), Glass continued to fail to present anything more than speculation 
and conjecture as to the testimony of a computer expert witness or Kathy Grover. 
Thus, the district court properly dismissed this claim. 
4. Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
In his successive petition, Glass asserted that the prosecution failed to 
disclose the Yahoo! Terms of Service Agreement and Yahoo! Registration Page. 
(R., pp. 20-25.) Glass asserted that the investigator violated the Terms of 
Service agreement by posing as a fifteen-year-old girl online. (R., pp. 21-22.) 
Glass contends that because the prosecutor failed to disclose this agreement, he 
was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the investigator about this 
purported violation of the agreement. (R., p. 22.) Glass alleged, "If trial counsel 
had access to this information at trial, counsel would have impeached the 
prosecution's key witness and presented a valid entrapment defense." (R., p. 
22.) In dismissing this claim, the district court ruled: 
Due process requires all material exculpatory evidence 
known to the state or in its possession be disclosed to the 
defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Glass has 
not shown that this is evidence the prosecution had before his trial. 
This claim is dismissed. Furthermore, if there was a violation of an 
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agreement, that would be an issue between Yahoo and the state's 
agents who allegedly violated a user agreement. Glass was not a 
party to that agreement. A violation of the agreement in and of 
itself would not give Glass an entrapment defense. Glass would 
also have to admit to the offense to claim entrapment which he has 
not done. See Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 139 P.3d 762 (Ct 
App. 2006). 
(R., p. 252) 
On appeal, Glass asserts that the district court erred in finding the Yahoo! 
Terms of Service Agreement (TOS) agreement not material and argues, "had the 
state disclosed the TOS, trial counsel could have made a strategic decision for 
an entrapment defense or formulated a jury instruction for entrapment at the 
trial." (Appellant's brief, p. 28.) According to Glass, the TOS supports his 
entrapment defense because the investigator violated the TOS when he created 
his online profile. (Id.) Glass has failed to show error. 
A post-conviction petitioner may be entitled to relief if he demonstrates the 
existence of "evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that 
requires vacation of the ... sentence in the interests of justice." LC.§ 19-4901(4). 
The four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a relief based 
upon a claim of newly discovered evidence is that the alleged evidence: {1) is 
newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is 
material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; {3) will probably produce an 
acquittal; and {4) failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence 
on the part of the defendant. Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323, 326, 955 P.2d 
1102, 1105 (1998); State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 
(1976). 
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Even assuming that the TOS was newly discovered, Glass cannot show 
that it is material and "not merely cumulative or impeaching." Nor can Glass 
show that the agreement "will probably produce an acquittal." Even if Glass 
could show a violation of the TOS agreement, it could only be used to impeach 
the investigator; it would not support an entrapment defense: 
Entrapment occurs when an otherwise innocent person, not 
inclined to commit a criminal offense, is induced to do so by a state 
agent who, desiring grounds for prosecution, originates the criminal 
design and implants in the mind of the innocent person the 
disposition to commit the alleged offense. There is a distinction 
however, between originating the idea to commit the crime and 
merely furnishing the opportunity to commit it. 
Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal 
citations omitted). Glass has not even alleged what evidence purportedly 
supports an entrapment defense, let alone shown the possibility of a valid 
entrapment defense. Moreover, the evidence of Glass's guilt is overwhelming. 
The court of appeals held in Glass's direct appeal: 
[TJhe online interaction between "lisa200215ncal" and 
"letsgetkinky831" was a private conversation to which only those 
two were a party. "Lisa200215ncal" provided "letsgetkinky831" with 
the address of a vacant apartment complex near Fairview Avenue. 
"Letsgetkinky831" responded by saying his name was "Tom" and 
that he would be coming from the north side of Boise. He also 
indicated that he would be arriving in a small, black two-door car 
and that he was leaving his residence immediately to come to the 
apartment because he needed to go to work later. Twenty-three 
minutes later, the detectives witnessed a black two-door car driving 
into the apartment complex parking lot. While the detectives did 
lose sight of the car, shortly thereafter Glass arrived and knocked 
on the door where the detectives had set up the sting. Given this 
evidence, we conclude there was substantial evidence upon which 
a reasonable jury could have concluded that Glass was the person 
behind the "letsgetkinky831" screen name. 
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Glass, 146 Idaho at 85, 190 P.3d at 904. Given the strength of this evidence, it is 
highly unlikely that a violation of the TOS agreement would have led to an 
acquittaL Further, the district court correctly noted that a violation of that 
agreement would be an issue between Yahoo! and the detective. Finally, as 
explained by the district court, in order to prevail on an entrapment defense, the 
defendant must acknowledge that he committed the crime. See Suits, 143 Idaho 
at 164, 139 P.3d at 766. Glass continues to deny that he was "letsgetkinky 831." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 29 ("Glass maintains that he was not letsgetkinky831 and 
that he did not chat with Detective.").) For these reasons, Glass cannot show 
error in the district court's dismissal of this claim for relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Jimmy Thomas Glass's successive petition for post-
conviction relief. 
DA TED this 12th day of December 2011 . 
~ 
ELIZAB TH A. KOECKERI 
Deputy Attorney General 
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